Abstract. NIST received comments from 109 separate government agencies, companies, and private individuals concerning the proposed D i g i d Signature Standard. Both positive and negative comments were received. However the number of ncgarive comments was significantly larger than normally received for a proposed Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS). This paper summarizes the major comments, both positive and negative, and provides responses where appropriate. The paper highlights the anticipared significant modifications to the proposed standard and concludes by discussing the future milestones that need to be accomplished before the proposed DSS becomes a FIPS.
Introduction

History of the DSA
In August. 1991 FRDSSI. the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NET) proposed a Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) for use in computing and verifying digital signatures in government applicarions. 5he DSA was proposed in a draft Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [DRPSXX] as the initial step of a process leading to a Federal Information Processing Standard.
The goal was 10 provide a standard for government organizations to use for applications in which a digilal signature is required. Private and commercial organizations are cncouraged to adopt and use the DSS as well. This paper discusses the primary issues that were raised during the public comment period on the DSS.
The Digital Signature Algorithm is used for mathematically computing and verifying a digital signature. The algorithm explicitly defines the parameters (name, type. size but not value) and specifies h e computalions for signature generation and \>erification. A digital signature is simply a number that depends upon the contents of the message and the private key of the message signer. The signature is normaily transmitted with the message. A verifier. who has possession of the message. zhe signature, and h e public key of the signer, can determine that the signature was generated by Ihe signer and was not modified, either accidentally or inrentionally. In addition, the the level of security provided. the applicability of parents, the ease of export from the US., the impact on national security and law enforcement, and the efficiency in a number of government and commercial applications. A number of techniques were reviewed and deemed appropriate for providing adequate protection in Federal systems. Among these, NIST placed primary emphasis on selecting the technique that best assures appropriate security for Federal information and does not require payment of royal!ies by U.S. private or commercial interests. All proposals were coordinated with the national security and law enforcement communities.
A Digital Signature Algorithm should have several technical characteristics. First, it must compute a signatwe which depends on the contents of the message and the private key of the person [hat originated it. Second, the private key used for signature generation should not be computable knowing the public key used for signature verification.
Third, the efficiency of senerating keys, signing messages and verifying messages should have an acceptable impact on performance in various implementations and applications. Fourth. a digital signature algorithm should be useful in many different applications and provide a level of security commensurate with the value or scnsirivityof the data being protected.
Several digital signature algorithms have been proposed in the technical literature. Eac3 exhibits the above characteristics to a greater or lesser degree. NIST proposcd an algorithm which satisfies the desired rechnical characteristics in addition to the established non-technical criteria. This paper summarizes the comments received during the first public solicitadon for com.rnen*.s on ;he proposed standard, provides responses to b e comments, and discusses planned revisions to the proposed DSS.
G A O Decision 8-245714
Government agencies have often raixd qucstions concerning the legality of using a digiul rather bhan a written signature. A "catch 22" condition existed. Agencies would not use digitai signature technology because the regulations appeared 10 require written signatures, and thc regulations were not changed or clarified because agcncies were not using the new iechnology. In order to help clarify the issue, NIST requested a formal decision from h e General Accounting Office (GAO) [h-LETj. Based on its analysis of an agency's finamial system and operating procedures, the GAO often grants relief against iinancml loss. If funds are lost as the result of a weakness in the system or the operational procedures, h c !oss will come out of general revenues rather than the funds of the agency.
NIST asked the GAO whether NIST srandards for electronic signatures could be used 10 record obligations in government Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) payments. The GAO decision [GA09l] established the criteria for government use of electronic signatures for ED1 technologies consistent with 31 U.S.C. Section 1501. Elecuonic signatures had to be unique and they had to provide a verifiable binding of the individual to the uansaction. particular. the GAO stated that "ED1 systems using message authentication codes which follow NISTs Computer Data Authentication Standard (Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 11 3) or digital signatures following NlSTs Digital Signature Smdard. as currently proposed, can produce a form of evidence that is acccptable under section 1501." responders supported the government's goal of having a standard that was free of patent impediments and expressed their desire that there be a federal standard for digital signatures which would provide for interoperability and a common level of security. Many government agencies supported the proposed standard. A sample of some positive comments is provided below:
1.
2.
The DSA will be especially useful to rhe financial services industry The DSS is the key to robust and secure transfer of funds between individuals, financial instirutions, governments and corporations There will be minimal cost impact if the proposed standard is implemented Generating keys for the DSA is a relatively efficient operailon
The DSA is the only signature algorithm that has been publicly proposed by any government We recommend that the algorithm be adopted as a FIPS The Department applauds NISTs work in developing a DSS that wiii help to meet the needs of Federal 3.
4.
.
6.
7.
departments and agencies ....
Response to Negative Comments
Like the Data Encryption Standard (DES) proposed fifteen years earlier as a Federal Information Processing Standard. the DSS received many negative comments, but the comments generally fell into one of several categories.
Some responders believed that since the selection process of the proposed DSA bad not been public, the usual standards making process was not followed. Other people thought the solicitation for comments was the end of the standards process rather than just the beginning and therefore did no[ believe sufficient time was being provided for evaluation of the proposal. Many noted that the proposal was an alternative 10 the Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) algorithm iRIVESTl that has achieved a high degrec of public acceptance. Selecting an allemative to ~e RSA was felt to have a negative impact by those that had a financial interest and a positive impact by some that had alternative financial interests. Finally. several lechnical concerns were expressed regarding the security and efficiency of the proposed algorithm. These concerns and responses are summarized below.
4.1
The DSA selection process was not public
Response:
The early discussions leading to k proposal of the DSA algori~hm were not public. The Computer Security Act of 1987 states that NIST "shall draw upon computer sysiem technical sccilrity guidelines developed by the National Security Agency ...." ICSA871. NISTfollowed its normal standards development procedures, the provisions of the act, and the memorandum of understanding esablished with the National Security Agency (NSA). Several alternatives were considered before the DSA was selected. The cooperation between NIST and NSA was publicly known. NIST advised the appropriate ANSI accredited standards committees, as well as others. of the joint effon.
In the normal standards development process, NIST identifies the need for a standard. produces technical specifications of a standard using inputs from different sources and then solicits government and public comment on the proposal. After the comment period, the comments are analyzed, appropriate changes are made and a revised standard issued (or further comment is solicited if the revisions are substantial). This public process is being followed. NlST made the specification of the algorithm public and then solicited comments on the proposed algorithm. NIST personnel have givcn talks on the DSS io Accredited Standards Committee (ASC) X9. Working Group X9F1, Interop 92, the First International Symposium on Cryptographic Security, the Federal Computer Security Program Managers' Forum, and the NIST Computer Security and Privacy Advisory Board. Working Group X9F1, which makes financial standards related to public key cryptography, is now developing a standard thar is equivalent to the DSA [DANSIX9].
Sufflcleat time for analysis has not been provided
Several parties felt that rhe thrcc month comment period did not provide sufficient time for analysis of the algorithm. In response to a formal request. NIST extended the comment period for another three months. Few new comments were provided after the initial three month period.
Response:
NIST considered the initial three month comment period to be only part of the total DSS evaluation process. The security of the DSA is believed to be equivalent to the difficulty of solving the discrete logarithm problem which has been studied for several years. The ElGamal tkchnique, upon which Ihe DSA is based, has been nudied since 1984 and remains basically sound. The DSA does have some new features. h particular. r is calculated by computing (g'mod p) mod q. However, the new feaiures as well as the entire algorithm were evaluated by the NSA and underwent the same analysis used by NSA to evaluate classified cryptographic systems. In fact. the DSA may be. used to sign unclassified data processed by "Warner Amendment" systems (10 U.S.C. 2315 and 4 4 U.S.C. 350212)) as well as classified dala in selected applications [FRDSS] .
It is now almost a year since the algoriihm was publjcly proposed and no cryptographic shortcut atracks have Seen found. NIST will continue to evaluate the merits of any proposed attack and will formally review the DSS at five year intervals. However. to be sure that there is no additional, currently unknown information about the algorithm or its revision (see Section 5.2 below). NIST has stated there will be a second public comment period on a revised DSS proposal before it is published as a standard. One of the selection criteria for the DSA was that it be free of patent impediments to the maximum extent possible.
An agreement to grant non-exclusive, royalty free licenses had been made by the International Business Machines Corporauon in 1975 prior to adopting the DES, which was covered by IBM patents, as a Federal Information Processing Standard. A similar status was desired for h e DSS. Some alternative algorithms were considered less desirable because of known parent impediments. ?he DSS was designed by b e government specifically to meet rhe selection criteria, including the patent criteria. However, two claims of infringement (by Public Key P m e r s and Professor Claus P. Schnorr) were received during the comment period. In addition other comments expressed a concern h a t the DSS infringed the patents held by these enii:ies.
A major criterion for Ihe invention and selection of the DSS by h e government was to avoid patented technology that could result in payment of royalties for government. commercial and private us. This was stated in Congressional testimony in June, 1991, shortly before the DSS was issued for comment. A patent application was filed for the DSA on behalf of rhe government with rhe intent of making rhe DSS available on a non-exclusive, royalty-free basis. The palent claims were recently allowed by the US. patent office. The patents that are claimed to be infringed were directly or indirectly rcfercnced in rhe DSA patent application.
Based on its initial analysis of existing patents, NlST believed the DSA did not infringe on any known patents. As a result of the claims of infringement, NIST is attempting to clarify the patent issue (see Section 5.1). The judgment of infringement is a complex legal issue and outside the scope of this paper. The DSA does not provide for secret key distribution because the DSA is not intended for secret key distribution. In many applications a digital signature capability for integrity and nonrepudiation is sufficient and secret key distribution is not necessary. NIST does recognize Ihe need for secret key distribution in other applications (eg.. where encryption is used). However, NIST and NSA have not yet selected such a method. NIST decided that it would be better to provide a public key based signature system immediately than to wait for bolh a signature system and secret key distribution system at =me later time.
In addition, there are certain advantages to having separatc algorithms for signature and key distribution. Erst. cryptographic algorithms that do not encipher data clearly come under the Department of Commerce export rules whereas export of encryption algorithnis is controlled by the Depanment of State procedures which tend to be more restrictive [NBUL]. Secondly, certain countries readily permit the use of signature algorithms within their borders. but they restrict the use of encryption algorithms. NIST now plans to proceed with the process of making the proposed SHS a FIpS. Table 1 shows sample SHA processing rates obtained for C code implementations of the SHA on three different computers. Other implernentors may obtain differing rates based upon rhe degree to which the code has been optimized, the compiler used, and o k r factors. The rates appear adequate for many data security applications. Intemarional Standard 9796 [IS97961 is a standard for dlgi!al signatures w i t h message recovery. According to this standard the message must be half the block size of 3 reversible public key encryption algorithm. The message is then redundantly padded to fill the entire block size and [hen "encryped" with the user's private key to form the signature. An n-bit message results in a 2n-bit signature. Any verifier of the signature can use the public key of the signer to recover the redundantly encoded message. Rather than having the signer send the message as well BS the signature. IS 9796 permits thc recovery of the message from the signature itself.
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IS 9796 specifies a digital signature scheme which provides message recovery from the signature. It is inefficient for signing moderate or long messages one half block at a time. The standard does allow for signing a message digest instead of a message, but then one would have to transmit the message along with the signatwe and the reversibility of the algorithm would provide no apparent advantage.
Since the DSA is not reversible, it could no1 meet the requirements of IS 9796 for a reversible algorithm. However. producing a 2n-bit signature from an n-bit message (as with IS 9796) is inefficient and causes unnecessary data expansion. When the DSA is used with the SHA algorithm an n-bit message will result in a 320-bit signature, and only n+320 bits need be transmitted. Thus. messages longer than 320 bits, or shorter than the block size minus 320 bits, will have less data transmission requirements if signed using the DSA.
In addition, there have been proposals for an alternative international signature standard. called "Digital Signature with Appendix". This alternative standard would permit the use of nonreversible algorirhms for digital signatures and would not require that a n-bit message produce a 2n-bit signature. NET will propose that the DSA algorithm be one of the algorithms that may be used in conjunction with the proposed alternative standard.
4.7
The modulus 1s fixed a t 512 bits Some parties responding to the request for comments believed that the DSA was insecure because the modulus was fixed at 512 bits. Others felt that although 512 bits provided adequate securily !or most of today's applications. it was not adequate for public key cenificates and long term security.
Response:
The secUrity of the DSA is based on the difficulty of solving the disciete log problem. Most security expens consider the discrete log problem to be at least as difficult as factoring (i.e., solving y = g' mod p for x is as difficult as wiving n = a * b for a and b when p is the same size as n). Therefore. the 512-bit DSA is at leas? as secure as many products. whose security is based on factoring, h a t are currently on the market today. One responder eaimated that today It would take over eight million dollars (2.1 million MPS2-years @ $4 per MIPSyear) to break the DSA but recommends allowing a modulus sizc of at least 710 bits.
Currently, smart card systems have !imited computational capabilities which would be heavily utilized in implementing a 51 2-bit public key algorithm. Smart card implementations of larger modulus sizes are not yet practical. However, implementing a 512-bit algorihn in a s m M card where the private key never needs to leave the card may offer much greater overall security than implementing a larger size modulus in a shared PC.
In response to the comments that a larger modulus size is required for certificates and long term security, modulus sizes of up to 1024 bits will be allowed. The revised standard will allow modulus sizes of 512, 576.640, 704,768. 832, 896,960, and 1024 bits. This array of sizes should be sufficient for prorccting scnsiuve unclassified data for the foreseeable future.
T h e 160-bit size of q 1s too small
Response:
Some parties claimed that the 160-bit size of q is too small but no analpical justification for this claim was provided. The 160-bit q provides a work factor of 2" which is consistent with the 160-bit message digest provided by the SHA. (Note that the 160-bit SHA message digest is already 32 bits longer than most other accepted message digests.) Assuming 32 x 10" operations per MIPS-year and a cost of S4 per MIPS-year, one would expect to spend at least [(2moperations)/(32 x 10'2~peration~IPS-ycar)] x (M/MIPS-year) = $151.000,000,000 to recover a single key, x. It has been estimated by Andrew Odlyzko that this is roughly the same effon that would be required to break a discrete log system with a 1024-bit modulus using the number field sieve. Therefore, the 160-bit q appears to be sufficient even when a 1024-bit p is used.
Compromise of k would compromise the private key
Response:
Compromise of k would compromise the private key x. However i t has nor been shown that compromising k is any easier than compromising x itself. Both x and k are randomly or pxudorandomly generated; both x and k are kept in the mosf secure area of the cryptographic module; and neither x nor k need be known to any human being.
If an adversary can gain physical access to k, h e n the adversary could also gain physical access to x. The DSA is designed so that neither x nor k can be determined from the signature.
NIST will suggest techniques for generating the x, k, and other values in an appendix of the DSS. In addition. L%e authors highly recommend the use of smart cards to protect private keys and any other Secret parameters used by public key algorithms.
Weak values of p could be selected by a dishonest CA
A claim was made that a dishonest Certification Authorily (CA) could purposely select a value of p for its own users which would permit the CA to recover the private keys of h e users.
Response:
The proposed DSS specifies a Digital Signature Algorithm. It does not discuss all the ways the algorithm may be used or misused. The qualifications section of b e DSS Announcement states that "The responsible authority in each agency or department shall assure that an overall implementation provides an acceptable level of security." The proposed DSS specifically states that. "Systems for certifying credentials and distributing cenificates are beyond the scope of this standard." Therefore, one would not expect an algorithm specification standard to cover the case of a dishonest cenifcation authoriiy.
The DSS allows users to generate their own primes, p and q. The DSS alSo allows the user to use primes generated by a trusted p a y or a certification authority. If primes are known to be randomly generated, the user can even accept primes generated by a distrusted party. One can constmct special primes that are considered weak. If they were used the private keys of the users might be recovered. (Note that many other algorithms have similar weak values.) However, the probability of generating a weak prime at random is infinitesimally small. (The probability of generating a weak p at random has been eaimated to be less than loH).) Two parties pointed out that the use of a one-way function, such as the SHA. in the process that generates p and q could ensure that weak values occw only randomly. By making publicly known the inpur to the SHA, the resulting p, the resulting q, and the process. the user would be able to verify that weak primes were not purposely construcred. A technique which makes use of h e SHA in the generation of DSA primes is propsed in Appendix A of this paper.
The claim that a trapdoor was purposely placed in the DSA was the subject of a panel session at Eurocrypt 92. NO evidence of an intent to put a trapdoor in the DSA was presented and by the end of the session h e claim was substantially discredited.
Warning! AS with all systems using a certification authority, the certification authority must be trusted to correctly establish the binding between the user's identity and the u&s public key.
4.11
The DSA 1s less efficient for verificatlon
Response:
Some of the comments provided inaccurate estimates of the computation time required for the DSA. Obviously one would like a signature algorithm to be as efficient as possible while still providing adequate security. The real issue is whether the DSA verification speed is sufficient. On a 386 personal compute?, the DSA can validate a signature in less than one second and the same computation can be done in milliseconds in hardware. These times are adequate for most applications.
In order to fully understand the computational differences between the DSA and RSA one must consider five different computations: global computations, key generation computations. pre-computations, signature computations and verification computations.
Global compulalions may be performed once for a set of users and need not be recomputed for a long period of time. Therefore. these computations do not normally impose a severe penalty on the operational system. For the DSA. the computation of p. q. md g could be considered global computations. The RSA does not have a similar computation.
K e y generarion compufarions are performed in generaling the public and private keys. For DSA one must generate x and y as the private and public keys. For RSA, primes p and q must be generated and e and d computed. (Note h a t when using the Chinese remainder theorem. d mod (p-1) and d mod (q-1) are generated instead of d.)
The pre-compurorions for the DSA are performed for each message to be signed. However, these computations may be performed before any message is selected to be signed. These pre-computations involve generating k-' and r as inputs to the signature generation computation. RSA has no similar computation.
For DSA the signomre genernfion compuralions :nvolve generation of the message digest. H(m). and the s portion of the signature. For RSX signature generarion. one must compute s = (H(rn))d mod n.
When performing the signature verficorwn cumpurarions the DSA computes a putative r from the received message m. the received r, and the received s. If h e computed value of r equals the received value of I the signature is verified. Otherwise the signature is rejec:ed. Using the RSA one computes sa mod nand compares it to the message digest of the receivec message. Table 2 indicates some sample compumtion times for the DSA and RSA algorihrns performed either in a Hitachi H8-310 smart card processor or in a hon personal computer. Efficient smart card implementations of public key cryptography are difficult to achieve because of the limited capabilities of current 8-bit man card processors. On fasrer computers or special purpose smart card processors, h e differences in cumpumrion rimes beiween me DSA and RSA algorithms become less significant 10 h e human observer.
The DSS offers an advantage with regard to its extremely efficient computation of the private and public keys. The private key is any randomly generared 160-bit value called x and the public key is y where y = g' mod p. Since both computations are efficient the private and public keys can be easily generated on a smarf card. While the public key can be read from the smnn card at any time. the private key never needs to leave the protection of the card. Observed DSA key generation computations are 40-SO timer faster than RSA key generation computations.
Products are mentioned in this paper for informarional purposes only and do not constitute an endorsement.
In addition, the DSS has rhe capability of performing mosi of the signature computations before the actual message to be signed has been selected. ?his is done by pre-computing k. k", and r. In fact several k, k', and r values may be precomputed in a fashion that is transparent to rhe user. Then, when the user selects the message or data to be signed. the signature will be computed in a fraction uf a second. This feature is especially useful in ioday's smart card systems where the card will perform the necessary pre-computations while the user is selecting and forming the message to be signed. Therefore, the signature process appears very efficient to the user. In summary, the DSA validation computarion appears to be adequate for many government and commercial applications. The DSA generates keys very efficiently and provides a pre-compurarion feaure that can make the signature computation transparent to the user. Verification, although less efficient. is adequate for nearly all applications. These features may make :he DSA highly desirable for many applications involving smart cards.
The DSS is "buggy"
One responder claimed that the DSS is "buggy" because if s = 0 then h e computation of s at signature verification would "blow up". In addition if s = 0, Lhcn the user's private key x could be recovered.
Appllcatlons Symposium
NIST plans to host a Symposium on the Applications of Digital Signature Technology. The purpose of the symposium is to provide a forum for discussion of common problems, goals, and issues pertaining to the application of the DSA. Further information will be provided as plans develop.
Internntlonal Infrastructure
NIST is studying the legal and technical issues related to development and operation of an international digital signature infrastkcture. 'The infrastructure would be a system of organizations, people and computers used for distributing certificates to individuals, government agencies and private companies. ' The study will examine the legal and regulatory requirements which must be addressed, propose a certification authority architecture, and attempt to clarify the roles that various government agencies wish to perform. Several U.S. government agencies are participating in and financing the study.
NIST perceives a great need for such an infrastructure. Elecrronic filing of corporate and personal tax returns could be made more efficient and more secure if such a structure were available. Federal payments to contractors, vendors and social security recipients could be fully automated if the integrity and authenticity of electronic payments were
assured. An international infrastructure is needed to provide security for worldwide businesscommunications. NIST is presently working with the federal organizarions responsible for such large scale applications. NIST intends to hold workshops with potential users and knowledgeable technical people in order to develop an infrastructure that will meet these anticipated needs.
It is intended that the infrastructure will utilize existing concepts and vstems. International Standard X.509 (a security part of the Directory standard) describes a tree structure for eenifying digital signatures. A digital signature certificate distribution system has been designed in conjunction with the Privacy Enhanced Mail project. NISTplans to build on these efforts to produce a recommendation for consideration by federal organizations planning to use digital signatures. Results of the present srudy are aniic~pated in the middle of 1993.
Conclusion
Several milestones have been met and several still need to be accomplished. NIST will continue the work required for adoption of the proposed Digital Signature Standard as an approved Federal Information Processing Standard.
NIST alw believes thar an international infrastructure is required in order for digial signatures to be widely used throughout the U.S. government and the world.
Let L -1 = n*160 + b, where both b and n are integers and 0 L b < 160
Step 1.
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Step 3.
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Step 6.
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Step 11.
Step 12.
Step 13.
Step 14.
Step 15.
Choose an arbitrary sequence of at least 160 bits and call it SEED. Let g be the length of SFED in bits.
Compute U = SHAISEED] XOR SHA[(SEED+l) mod 2' 1.
Form q from U by setting ae most significant bit [the 2'" bit) and the least significant bit to 1. In terms of boolean operations, q = U OR 2'" OR 1. Note b a t 2l" c q <2".
Use a robust primality resting algorithm 10 test whether q is prime'.
If q is not prime. go to step 1.
k t counter = 0 and offset = 2.
F o r k = 0. ..., n let V, = SHA[(SEED + offset + k) mod 2' 1.
Let W be h e integer W = V, + VICZ1m +..... + V=,*Pi'*'* + (V, mod 27 *2"'1M
and let X = W + 2L'. Note *at 0 L W < ?' and hence 2L' L X < 2L.
Let c = X mod 2q and set p = X -(c-I). Nore that p is congrucnt to 1 mod 2q.
If p < 2Li, then go to step 13.
Perform a robust prirnaliiy test on 7.
If p passes ihe test performed in step 11, go to step 15.
Let counter = counter+l and lsffszt = offset + n + I .
If counter 2 2" = 4096 go to step 1, orherwise { i t . , if counter < 4096) go to step 7.
Save the value of SEED and the mluc of counter for use in certifying Lhe proper generation Of P and q.
A robust primality test is one where the probability of a non-prime number passing the test is at most 2-.
